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1. Two very different yet related scholars 
Comparing the intellectual output of two scholars is always a hard effort 
because you have to deal with the complexity of a thought expressed in its 
specificity. A fortiori, it is difficult to compare two historically and cultu-
rally different scholars. Specifically, the aim of this paper is to identify the 
connecting elements in the intellectual production of Antonio Gramsci and 
Charles Tilly, two authors who lived in different historical and social con-
texts and were, in many ways, culturally distant. Gramsci was a communist 
political leader who wrote from the cell into which he had been imprisoned 
by the Italian fascist regime between 1926 and 1937. Tilly, instead, operat-
ed in a democratic context, the United States, in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Whereas the first is mainly concerned with identifying 
the historical conditions for the construction of a revolutionary process in 
the West within a Marxist perspective, the latter is interested in studying 
social change starting from the phenomena of conflict and mobilization, but 
within a liberal democratic frame. Two authors seemingly incomparable 
but actually united by a common reaction to a certain evolutionistic sociol-
ogy that has its roots in the mechanicistic positivism of the nineteenth cen-
tury, culminating in the form of the structural-functionalist paradigm in the 
twentieth century. Both are interested in the dynamics of conflict expressed 
by an organized civil society that reacts to the dominant system of power. 
Both finally identify in history, and especially in historical comparison, a 
basic analytic tool for social scientists in the prospect of tracing some regu-
larities and limited generalizations. We will focus on these aspects of anal-
ogy, always trying to historically contextualize the thought and the intellec-
tual production of these two scholars.  
In order to understand the relevance of Antonio Gramsci’s social theory, it 
must be contextualized in the broader historical framework of theoretical 
Marxism. Strongly influenced at a young age by Antonio Labriola’s Marx-
ism (Badaloni 1975; Paggi 1979), Gramsci soon developed a critical attitu-
de towards the kind of determinist Marxism as expressed by the principal 
leaders of the Second International, such as Kautsky, as well as by some 
theorists of the Bolshevik revolution, such as Plekhanov and Bukharin. In 
fact, from Kautsky to Stalin, a whole generation of Marxist thinkers had 
supported the argument that the historical process obeyed specific laws of 
necessity, so that it was possible to imagine the transition to socialism as an 
automatic process, inscribed in history. The masses of workers were de fac-
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to deprived of their subjectivity in the revolutionary process. Such interpre-
tation of Marx's historicism in an evolutionary key presupposes the histori-
cal irrelevance of class action carried out by the proletarian masses.  
Antonio Gramsci, by providing a different interpretation of Marxist theory, 
counters the automation of evolution with the collective will of the masses. 
Not incidentally, Marx himself in his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach states: 
«The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the 
point, however, is to change it» (Marx 1958, vol.2, 405). Gramsci, through 
Marx, emphasizes the human element that realizes itself through the orga-
nized action of civil society. Also Marx certainly risked ending in some 
forms of determinism, by predicting the capitulation of the capitalist system 
under the influence of the contradictions expressed by the system itself; yet, 
in his work, he would always stress the aspect of driving force represented 
by the political consciousness of the masses. Karl Kautsky, on the contrary, 
long considered the guardian of Marxist orthodoxy, offeres a mechanistic 
interpretation of Marx in stating that: «Marx and Engels recognized that 
revolutions are not made at will. They come with inevitable necessity, 
when the conditions which render them necessary exist, and are impossible 
so long as those conditions, which develop gradually, do not exist» (cited in 
Fried, Sanders 1964, 436). Kautsky’s view clearly denies the role of human 
intervention in the historical process, thus rejecting the possibility of histor-
ical alternatives. Such an objectivist theory of history is also central to the 
thinking of Plekhanov and Bukharin in the process of Marxism Bolsheviza-
tion. As Salamini observes (1981, 4-5), «From a theory of capitalism struc-
ture and development, [it] becomes the theory of the creation of new histor-
ical formations, that is, new forms of human organizations and institu-
tions». Gramsci’s aim is, therefore, to restore the unity between political 
theory and praxis.  
Leninism had already represented, in a certain way, a valid response to the 
mechanicism of the Second International, by emphasizing the party’s role 
of political leadership, but had been unable to explain the failure of the re-
volutionary perspective in the West. According to Gramsci, the core of the 
problem does not lie so much in the non-realization of the objective histori-
cal conditions, as in the absence of a subjective realization of the objective 
conditions for social transformation. It is precisely this insistence on the 
subjective elements in Marx's theory that differentiates Gramsci from Le-
nin. According to the Gramscian perspective, social transformation is a fun-
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ction of the creative role of the masses and of their political ability to arti-
culate a revolutionary consciousness. From this point of view, the intellec-
tuals’ role becomes crucial. The Italian philosopher states that «every revo-
lution has been preceded by an intense labor of criticism, by the diffusion 
of culture and the spread of ideas amongst masses of men» (Gramsci 1977, 
12). The basic themes of his writings, therefore, concern the clear rejection 
of mechanistic and economistic interpretations of Marx's doctrine and the 
adherence to a fully historicist and humanist form of Marxism. Marxism is 
for Gramsci not only an economic science, but first and foremost a world-
view that points to an intellectual and moral reform of society. This goal is 
unattainable without the collective will created in political praxis. The 
process of social reformation is, therefore, the result of the historical trans-
formation of the “economic class” into a “historical class” that takes place 
in the dialectical relationship between the masses and the intellectuals. 
Revolution is for Gramsci primarily a process of cultural reform. Therefore 
both intellectuals and the party, interacting with the popular masses, must 
work toward the development of a political consciousness and a collective 
will, corresponding to the elaboration of a historically grounded ideology 
of transformation. If the aim is the revolutionary seizure of power, it is also 
true that the subaltern classes, in order to be successful, must work towards 
creating the conditions for transformation, aiming to be an ideologically 
hegemonic class well before becoming the dominant social group. The so-
cialization of the means of material production is only one aspect of the re-
volutionary process, which must be associated with the socialization of the 
means of cultural and intellectual production. As Buci-Glucksmann ob-
serves (1979), Gramsci’s thought goes beyond the mere culturalistic rein-
terpretation of classical Marxism, and this makes of him a theorist of politi-
cal forms of transition defined by the dialectical relationship between social 
forces. From this point of view, we believe that the Gramscian categories 
can be articulated into the framework of a sociology of political praxis. The 
general sense of political praxis is the affirmation of the collective will, 
which becomes the hermeneutic canon of Gramscian historiography but, as 
Salamini observes (1981, 22), the structure of this praxis «is a dialectical 
unity of objective and subjective elements, of structural and superstructural 
activities, of materialism and idealism. Its major protagonists are the 
masses, the intellectuals, and the party. Its point of direction is the creation 
of hegemony». 
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Charles Tilly, on the other hand, is very attentive to the need to develop hi-
storically rooted social theories. Theories are for him a kind of working 
tool kit whose usefulness can certainly vary, yet, they contains the key to 
loosen recurrent explanatory knots. They provide always useful instruction 
even when they are bad instructions. In fact, «some of those instructions are 
worthless, some are misleading, and some are good. But it is normally bet-
ter to have a bad tool than none at all» (Tilly 1981, 11). Also a bad theory 
can, in fact, suggest useful pathways and produce shared modes for the res-
olution of important issues. In this regard, Tilly makes the example of the 
social differentiation theory developed by Durkheim. Although, he says, it 
has shown its ineffectiveness, it has been a beacon for sociological analysis 
by providing important tools for historical interpretation: 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Emile Durkheim elaborated a theory of social dif-
ferentiation and its consequences. The theory includes, among other things, a sort of race 
between differentiation and shared beliefs: If society’s shared beliefs accumulate faster than 
it differentiates, change is orderly; if differentiation  proceeds faster than shared belief, dis-
order (suicide, industrial strife, protest, sometimes even revolutions) results. Durkheim’s 
theory is bad […] it not only generates invalid historical analogies (for example, between 
individual crime and collective protest) but also misstates the causal similarities among situ-
ations (for example, different streams of rural-to-urban migration) that are, in fact, analog-
ous. (ibid.) 
But there are also some good theories. Tilly, in this regard, makes the ex-
ample of the theory of dual power developed by Leon Trotsky. The Russian 
intellectual, in his attempt to explain the social conditions of revolutionary 
phenomena, states that a prerequisite for revolution is the existence of an 
alternative concentration of power in the dominant system of power 
(Trotsky 1965). A sort of counter-government to which people can divert 
their obedience when the existing government demonstrates its incompe-
tence and intolerance. This approach is undoubtedly correct and it proves to 
be not only a good theory but a historically grounded theory. Not by chan-
ce, Trotsky carries out his analysis through a comparative study of three re-
volutionary phenomena, the English Revolution of the seventeenth century, 
the French Revolution of 1789, and the Russian Revolution of 1917. The 
selection of three case studies limits the theoretical domain of Trotsky's as-
sertions since his conclusions are not applicable, as he himself admits, out-
side a context characterized by a strong, autonomous and centralized na-
tional state. Such restrictions on the possibility of extending generalizations 
are in fact the price that all theories rightly accepting the challenge of his-
torical contextualization have to pay. It is evident that the potential role that 
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the social sciences can play in the context of historical research is undoub-
tedly important. Alternatively the social sciences risk becoming a large gal-
lery of theories and concepts relating to completely abstract causal analo-
gies and potentially unnecessary to the understanding of historical and so-
cial phenomena. 
 
2. Against evolutionary sociology and structural-functionalism  
In order to develop their ideas, both scholars react to the theoretical paradi-
gms of their times. Whereas Gramsci, consistent with the evolutionistic 
conceptions of the social science in the nineteenth century, strongly oppos-
es Marxist determinism, Tilly harshly criticizes the functionalist paradigm, 
which is the natural continuation of nineteenth-century evolutionism. In 
particular, Charles Tilly feels compelled to question the approach of Durk-
heim who, with his emphasis on differentiation processes seen as the pecu-
liar traits of modernity, would strongly influence the subsequent develop-
ment of social theory in a functionalistic sense.  
Sociology and Marxism, for Gramsci, have reached a state of stagnation. 
They have abandoned their original ideological function dissolving in the 
positivist framework. Sociology has become the science of the particular, 
engaged in producing detailed descriptions and sterile classifications. It has 
become an a-moral, a-political and a-historical science. It represented an 
attempt to create a method for historical-political science subordinated to 
evolutionistic positivism, an effort to describe and classify historical and 
political facts in accordance with the logic of natural sciences. It therefore 
represents the effort to experimentally obtain the evolutionary laws of hu-
man society, in order to produce predictions on the future of humanity. Yet, 
Gramsci observes, sociological laws have rarely had a causative signific-
ance, yet they risk falling into tautology by describing an event or a series 
of events and, through a mechanical process of abstract generalization, they 
risk turning a mere relationship of similarity into a law (Gramsci 1977a, 
PN11, 159-163). 
Actually, everything is born from a need, which Gramsci does not hesitate 
to define «somewhat childish and naïve» way to solve the practical prob-
lem of the predictability of historical events. Since the natural sciences se-
em to have the ability to predict the evolution of natural processes, also so-
ciology has been regarded as scientific only when it was able to predict the 
